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INTRODUCTION
Dewey & LeBoeuf, once one of the largest firms in the world,
employed more than 1,300 lawyers in twelve countries.1 A prime
example of the prototypical American law firm, Dewey & LeBoeuf
attracted some of the best lawyers in the country with its prestige and
promises of multi-million dollar bonuses.2 However, in what is called
“the largest law firm failure in U.S. history,” Dewey & LeBoeuf filed
Chapter 11 bankruptcy on May 28, 2012.3 As one former federal judge
put it, “‘[t]his is a very sad day for the legal profession, . . . Dewey is
a fabled firm with a lot of great lawyers and a demise of this magnitude
is unprecedented.’”4
Just two months earlier, amidst speculation and inconsistencies in
news reports, the American Lawyer announced that it would revise its
2010 and 2011 financial reports for Dewey & LeBoeuf’s revenue and
profitability.5 By then, many of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s partners already
1. Linda Sandler & Sophia Pearson, After Dewey & LeBoeuf, It’s Lawyers v. Lawyers, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK, May 31, 2012, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-05-31/after-dewey-andleboeuf-its-lawyers-v-dot-lawyers. For a general discussion of law firm failures and speculated causes,
see Peter Lattman, Dewey & LeBoeuf Files for Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2012,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/dewey-leboeuf-files-for-bankruptcy (commenting that many
observers of the Dewey & LeBoeuf bankruptcy, and of other large firm failures, attribute the collapse to
the trend of firms “discard[ing] the traditional notions of partnership—loyalty, collegiality, a sense of
equality—and instead transform[ing] themselves into bottom-line, profit-maximizing businesses”).
2. Lattman, supra note 1 (attributing the Dewey failure to rapid growth, aggressive hiring, excessive
salaries, and a large gap between salaries of senior and junior partners).
3. Brian Baxter, Demise of Dewey Eclipses Deaths of Smaller Firms, AM. L. DAILY, Sept. 13, 2012,
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/PubArticleDRO.jsp?id=1202571092557&Demise_of_Dewey_eclipse
s_deaths_of_smaller_firms&slreturn=20120813092324; Lattman, supra note 1.
4. Lattman, supra note 1. Dewey & LeBoeuf was not the only mega-firm to file bankruptcy in recent
years. See, e.g., Jay Adkisson, Howrey: When the Sinking Ship Seeks the Cheese Back From the Fleeing
Rats, FORBES, Aug. 1, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/2012/08/01/howrey-when-thesinking-ship-seeks-the-cheese-back-from-the-fleeing-rats (discussing the bankruptcy of Howrey, a firm
with more than 500 attorneys in sixteen offices); Leigh Jones, Federal Judge Leaves Heller Litigation in
Bankruptcy Court, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Dec. 14, 2011, http://newsandinsight.thomson
reuters.com/Bankruptcy/News/2011/12_-_December/Federal_judge_leaves_Heller_litigation_in_
bankruptcy_court (discussing the bankruptcy of Heller Ehrman, a firm of more than 500 attorneys); Nate
Raymond, Thelen Loses Clawback Case Against Seyfarth, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Sept. 4,
2012, http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/California/News/2012/09_-_September/Thelen_loses_
clawback_case_against_Seyfarth (discussing the bankruptcy of Thelen, a firm of more than 400
attorneys).
5. Peter Lattman, Prosecutors Scrutinize Ex-Head of Dewey, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2012,
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/04/27/new-york-prosecutors-examining-former-dewey-chairman.
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left the firm, and the firm announced cuts to attorneys’ rank and
administrative staff, reorganized its management structure, and
relocated from New York to London.6 Almost immediately after the
American Lawyer made its announcement, another twenty-three
partners left, bringing the total number of departures to sixty-seven
since the beginning of the year.7 In late April, Dewey & LeBoeuf
informed its partners that the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office was
investigating the firm for financial misconduct of its chairman, Steven
Davis.8 Over the next five days, Dewey & LeBoeuf desperately tried
to keep the firm afloat by entering merger discussions with two law
firms to no avail.9 With more than one third of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s
partners gone, the firm announced that it would close its doors and file
for bankruptcy.10 On March 6, 2014, Steven Davis and others were
indicted on more than 100 counts, including grand larceny, falsifying
business records, and securities fraud.11
Unfortunately, as is the case with many businesses, Dewey &
6. Key Events for Dewey, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405270230407
0304577394163080970888.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (providing a timeline of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s
2012 failure).
7. Id.
8. Id.; Lattman, supra note 5.
9. Key Events for Dewey, supra note 6. In addition to the merger discussions, Dewey & LeBoeuf
planned to put the executive floor of its headquarters up for lease, hoping to bring in millions each year.
Id.
10. Id. In the weeks leading up to this announcement, two associates reported their health coverage
lapsed for lack of payment, though the firm denied lack of payment and said there was a simple routing
issue that would soon be corrected. Id. Additionally, partners were told they would not receive paychecks
unless they submitted all outstanding client bills and time sheets. Id.
11. Concluding their two-year investigation, New York City officials further complicated troubles for
the Dewey & LeBoeuf estate, charging Davis and his top lieutenants with over 106 counts for alleged
criminal activity dating back to 2008. Jennifer Smith & Ashby Jones, Fallen Law Firm’s Leaders Are
Charged With Fraud, WALL ST. J., http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304554004
579423082266343204?mg=r eno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001
424052702304554004579423082266343204.html (lasted visited Mar. 6, 2014). The defunct firm’s
litigation woes also extend to civil suits filed by ex-partners and include allegations of third-party
assistance in concealing the fraud. Jennifer Smith, Dewey’s Former Leaders Sued, WALL ST. J., June 13,
2012, at B2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527023034104045774649624924
31118.html (discussing a lawsuit filed by a former partner against the firm alleging it ran a Ponzi scheme
with money invested by partners); Casey Sullivan, Ex-Dewey Partner: Citibank Schemed with Firm to
Hide its Woes, THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT, Aug. 31, 2012, http://newsandinsight.thomson
reuters.com/Legal/News/2012/08_-_August/Ex-Dewey_partner__Citibank_schemed_with_firm_to
_hide_its_woes (discussing counterclaim for fraudulent inducement filed against Citibank by former
Dewey partner sued for defaulting on a loan).
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LeBoeuf was unable to recover from the 2008 financial crisis, and by
the time it filed bankruptcy, Dewey & LeBoeuf owed more than $300
million to banks and other creditors and had more than $200 million
in outstanding client billings, with at least $60 million in unfinished
work taken to new firms.12 When Dewey & LeBoeuf and its creditors
reached a settlement deal to avoid potential clawback claims, it seemed
as though the troubles were behind the deflated firm and its partners,
pending court approval.13 The deal involved a $71 million payout from
more than 400 partners’ profits to the estate in exchange for immunity
from future lawsuits.14 However, the partners, and even their future
employers, will still be liable for any “unfinished business” of the firm,
irrespective of any settlement deal.15
When a law firm files bankruptcy or voluntarily dissolves, the
partners are subject to the unfinished business rule.16 This rule makes
it possible for a partner’s future fees derived from the dissolved firm’s
“unfinished business” to be taken back as property of the estate—even
if the partner completes the business while employed at a new firm.17
12. See Lattman, supra note 5 (noting that Dewey & LeBoeuf was unable to cope with financial
difficulties stemming from mismanagement with the economic recession in the backdrop); Key Events for
Dewey, supra note 6; Martha Neil, Dewey & LeBoeuf Estate Seeks $103.6M Clawback from Bankrupt
Firm’s Former Partners, A.B.A. J., July 11, 2012, http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/dewey_
leboeuf_estate_seeks_103.6m_clawback_from_bankrupt_firms_former_partn (summarizing Dewey &
LeBoeuf’s debts).
13. See Casey Sullivan, Judge Approves $71.5 mln Dewey Settlement, NAT’L LEGAL NEWS FROM
REUTERS, Oct. 10, 2012.
The trustee in a bankruptcy has a number of tools at his disposal to bring property back into the
estate. Certain clawback provisions in the Bankruptcy Code allow a trustee to reclaim property acquired
post-petition and treat that property as though it was acquired pre-petition, so it may be included in the
amount available to creditors. WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D
DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY TERMS § C55 (2013) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012)). The purpose of
these clawback or avoidance actions is to prevent the debtor from manipulating the bankruptcy filing date
to avoid paying certain creditors. Id. In addition to post-petition options, the trustee has a number of
avoidance powers to reclaim pre-petition transfers. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 544, 547, 548.
14. Sullivan, supra note 13. Dewey originally hoped to raise $90.4 million from the $432 million it
paid to 670 partners in 2011 and 2012 in its settlement. Alanna Byrne, Dewey Asks Court to Approve $70
Million Clawback Settlement, INSIDE COUNCIL FROM WSJ AND REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2012, available at
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/08/30/dewey-asks-court-to-approve-70-million-clawback-se. The
settlement would involve the trustee and the former partners, whereby the trustee would not pursue its
clawback and avoidance powers in exchange for an agreed upon amount. Id.
15. See Sullivan, supra note 13 (discussing the Dewey & LeBoeuf settlement deal and noting that the
trustee may still pursue unfinished business claims).
16. Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 18 (Ct. App. 1984).
17. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 477
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As one court described it, unfinished business is “any business covered
by retainer agreements between the firm and its clients for the
performance of partnership services that existed at the time of
dissolution.”18 Stated another way, when a partnership dissolves, the
client matters do not automatically dissolve with it.19 Attorneys go
their separate ways, each taking a piece of the partnership with them
in the form of clients, and to the extent that a partner works on a client
matter that was “unfinished” at the time of dissolution, that partner
must account to his fellow partners, or the estate, for that amount.20
Despite its decades-long history, two parts of the law are entirely
unsettled with courts, some even within the same district reaching
opposite conclusions.21 The first unanswered question asks what types
of client billing qualify as “unfinished” for purposes of applying the
rule, and more specifically, whether hourly fees should be included in
that calculation.22 Some courts argue that including hourly fees will
improperly impede the attorney-client relationship by treating the
client as nothing more than property of the estate.23 Other courts argue
that hourly fees should be included because one could not distinguish

B.R. 318, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“Partnership property remains partnership property, dissolution
notwithstanding, and a former partner of the dissolved firm must account for any benefit he derives from
his use of a partnership asset, even if he is not among the ‘winding up partners’ charged with winding up
the firm’s affairs.”).
18. In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, 408 B.R. 318, 333 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (citing
Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Ct. App. 1983)) (“[W]hat constitutes
unfinished business must be determined on the date of dissolution of the partnership, not based on events
occurring thereafter.” (citing Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571 (Ct. App. 1993))).
19. See Amanda A. Main, Applying the Unfinished Business Rule to Dissolved Law Partnerships, L.A.
LAW., Mar. 2010, at 10 (discussing the origin of the unfinished business rule and its application in both
voluntary dissolutions and bankruptcies).
20. See id. Obligations under the unfinished business rule can be waived, however, with express
partnership agreements. Id. For a discussion of these so-called “Jewel waivers,” see infra note 47.
21. Compare Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 742–43 (S.D.N.Y.
2012), with In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 330–31.
22. See Joan C. Rogers, New York, California Law Differ on Who Gets Defunct Firm’s Fees in Pending
Hourly Cases, BLOOMBERG BNA, Sept. 12, 2012, http://www.bna.com/new-york-california-n1717986
9614 (summarizing a recent case in the Southern District of New York rejecting the inclusion of hourly
fees in unfinished business claims).
23. An integral principle in the practice of law is that the client has an absolute right to hire or discharge
an attorney. See Echlin v. Sup. Ct. of San Mateo Cnty., 90 P.2d 63, 65 (Cal. 1939). To consider the hourlybilled client’s business as firm property, the client’s autonomy will be reduced to nothing more than an
interest in property. See discussion infra Part III.B–C.
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hourly from contingency fees, which are included.24 The second
question asks what level of compensation attorneys should be entitled
to receive for their services.25
Part I of this Note explains the foundation for the unfinished
business rule through the Uniform Partnership Act, fiduciary duties,
and Jewel v. Boxer, the seminal case interpreting the unfinished
business rule in law firm dissolutions.26 Part II addresses the recent
split among courts regarding whether hourly cases should be included
as part of the rule.27 Part III proposes hourly fees be excluded from the
unfinished business rule given the inclusion’s detrimental effect on
public policy.28
I. AN ATTORNEY’S BAGGAGE: THE INCOMPLETE HISTORY OF THE
UNFINISHED BUSINESS RULE
Lawyers seem to universally view the unfinished business rule as
both impactful and burdensome.29 Some have called the rule an
“imperfect rule [that] law firms have to live with,” while others have
gone much further, comparing its application in modern practice to

24. Compare In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 743 (distinguishing hourly from contingency fees), with In re
Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 331 (finding no meaningful distinction between types of fees).
Contingency fee rates are based on a set percentage of the damage award in the case. Lawyers and Legal
Fees, ST. B. GA., http://www.gabar.org/newsandpublications/consumerpamphlets/fees.cfm (last visited
Nov. 3, 2013). This type of arrangement is most common in personal injury cases. Id. Hourly fee rates are
set based on the amount of time expended by a particular attorney. Id.
25. Valerie P. Morrison & Dylan G. Trache, Jewel v. Boxer: The Unfinished Business of Bankrupt
Law Firms, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, Apr. 2012, at 92 (“The case law provides little guidance to assist
parties in determining the amount of profit recoverable in Jewel actions.”).
26. See discussion infra Part I.
27. See discussion infra Part II.
28. See discussion infra Part III. This Proposal assumes the parties have not entered into a partnership
agreement to the contrary. This Note proposes changes to the default standards and does not advocate for
a rule limiting partners’ ability to contract for specific aspects of the unfinished business rule.
29. See Paul R. Hage & Patrick R. Mohan, You Can’t Take Them with You: Coudert Brothers and the
Application of the Unfinished-Business Rule to Dissolved Law Firms, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug. 2012,
at 14, 73 (discussing In re Coudert Bros., where the court allowed the unfinished business rule to apply
to both former partners and their new law firms); Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92–93 (noting
that law firms need to keep in mind the possibility of litigation to reclaim profits from unfinished
business); Joan C. Rogers, Law Firms Must Pay Back Profits Earned on Dissolved Law Firm’s HourlyFee Cases, BLOOMBERG BNA, June 6, 2012, http://www.bna.com/law-firms-pay-n12884909901
(discussing arguments against the unfinished business rule in law firms).
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“‘watching an accident in slow motion.’”30 Not only can departing
partners face litigation from creditors and the trustee seeking to claw
back any profits from the bankrupt firm’s unfinished business, a
partner’s future employer can face the same liability if it receives
profits through the unfinished business of the bankrupt firm.31 For that
reason, it is important, if not vital, for law firms to beware of the rule
and put clear partnership agreements in place.32
A. The Birth of the Unfinished Business Rule: Partnership Acts and
Fiduciary Duties
The unfinished business rule developed through a long, and often
unmentioned road, with its origin in fiduciary duties owed through
partnership law.33 Partners owe fiduciary duties not only to each other,
but also to the partnership as a whole.34 The rationale for these duties
encourages, if not requires, implementation of rules that “circumscribe
the exercise of the partners’ managerial discretion.”35
30. See Rogers, supra note 29.
31. See Hage & Mohan, supra note 29, at 72–73; Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92–93.
32. Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 91 (encouraging law firms to amend partnership agreements
to clarify all rights and obligations pursuant to the firm’s unfinished business in the event of dissolution
and in order to avoid future litigation to recover the unfinished business of the firm).
33. J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL
AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 16:20 (2011) (“The right to wind up partnership affairs carries with it a
duty to do so, and a partner who is engaged in winding up the partnership continues to have fiduciary
duties to the partnership and his or her copartners.” (footnotes omitted)). A fiduciary duty is defined as
“[a] duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary . . . to the beneficiary . . . ;
a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty toward another person and in the best interests
of the other person.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
34. LESLIE D. CORWIN, LAW FIRM PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS § 1.03 (2013); see also D.C. CODE
§ 29-604.04 (West, WestlawNext through Oct. 16, 2013); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 53-3-404 (West,
WestlawNext through 2013 First Reg. Sess. of 62d Leg.); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 9A-404
(West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess. of Gen. Assem.); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 449.21 (West,
WestlawNext through P.A.2013, No. 277 of 2013 Reg. Sess., 97th Leg.); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 67424 (West, WestlawNext through 2013 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 54-1A-404 (West, WestlawNext
through First Reg. Sess. of 51st Leg.); N.Y. P’SHIP LAW § 43 (West, WestlawNext through L.2013, ch.
157); O.C.G.A. § 14-8-21 (2003 & 2013 Supp.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 61-1-404 (West, WestlawNext
through 2013 First. Reg. Sess.); WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 25.05.165 (West, WestlawNext through 2013
legislation); UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 21 (1914).
35. Michael Haynes, Comment, Partners Owe to One Another a Duty of the Finest Loyalty . . . . or
Do They? An Analysis of the Extent to Which Partners May Limit Their Duty of Loyalty to One Another,
37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 433, 437 (2005) (quoting ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, 2 BROMBERG
AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP § 6.07(a)(1) (2004)) (internal quotations omitted). In the absence of
fiduciary duties among partners, one partner could utilize and exploit the assets of the partnership with no
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In the majority of states, the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), or its
successor, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA),36 governs
partnerships.37 The UPA does not explicitly provide any duty of care
in the partnership context; in fact, it says almost nothing about what
specific duties partners owe to one another.38 According to the
Uniform Law Commission,
[t]he 1914 Act has very little to say about a partner’s
responsibilities to the other partners. A partner is a fiduciary who
“must account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as a
trustee for it any profit derived by him without the consent of the
other partners . . . ” There is a full duty of disclosure between
partners, but the 1914 Act is otherwise silent on the fiduciary
responsibilities of each partner to the other partners.39

In stark contrast, the RUPA explicitly provides for both a duty of
care and a duty of loyalty to fellow partners and the partnership.40
accountability. Id.
36. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101 (1997). The Revised Uniform Partnership Act has been enacted
in thirty-seven states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Legislative Fact Sheet—
Partnership Act, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/LegislativeFactSheet.aspx?title=Partnership
Act (last visited Nov. 3, 2013) (“Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Utah, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming”).
37. Russell C. Smith, Comment, How the Uniform Partnership Act Determines Ultimate Liability for
a Claim Against a General Partnership and Provides for the Settling of Accounts Between Partners, 17
CAMPBELL L. REV. 333, 359 (1995) (listing all states that have passed a version of the Uniform Partnership
Act and noting that Louisiana is the only state that has not passed the UPA). However, the UPA can vary
widely from state to state. Compare id. (noting that some states have made minor changes such as using
gender neutral terms and distinguishing limited liability partnerships), with CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra
note 33, § 1:1 n.4 (emphasizing that Georgia’s version of the law, enacted in 1984, is vastly different from
the model UPA).
38. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 3; see also CORWIN, supra note 34, at § 1.03.
39. Partnership Act Summary, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=
Partnership Act (quoting the Uniform Partnership Act (1914)) (last visited Nov. 3, 2013). The Uniform
Law Commission is a “non-profit unincorporated association, comprised of state commissions on uniform
laws from each state, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.” About the ULC, UNIF. L. COMM’N, http://uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=About the ULC
(last visited Nov. 3, 2013).
40. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(a) (“The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership
and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in subsections (b) and (c).”).
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Further, RUPA does not allow parties to waive these duties of loyalty
and care, even with partnership agreements to the contrary.41 The duty
of care, in the context of law firm dissolutions, refers to a duty owed
“to the partnership and the other partners in the conduct and winding
up of the partnership business” and requires partners to refrain “from
engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional
misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.”42
More relevant within the context of the unfinished business rule is
the duty of loyalty, which is the primary justification for the rule.43
This duty is generally defined as “[a] person’s duty not to engage in
self-dealing or otherwise use his or her position to further personal
interests rather than those of the beneficiary.”44 As one court noted,
there is, and should be, a “reasonable balance” between a partner’s
right to pursue “his own business after dissolution . . . and his duty of
loyalty to his ex-copartners.”45

41. Id. § 404 cmt. 1.
42. Id. § 404(c).
43. As part of the duty of loyalty, each partner owes to his fellow partners a duty to “wind[] up” the
unfinished business of the firm. Id. § 802 (emphasis added). Only when partners complete all unfinished
matters can this duty expire. Id; see also CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 33, § 16:20; Christopher C.
Wang, Comment, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Allocating Fees From the Unfinished Business of a
Professional Corporation, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1367, 1368–69 (1997).
The duty of loyalty is defined as follows:
A partner’s duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is limited to the
following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit
derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of the partnership business or derived
from a use by the partner of partnership property, including the appropriation of a
partnership opportunity;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or winding up of the
partnership business as or on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the partnership;
and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the partnership
business before the dissolution of the partnership.
REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(b) (emphasis added).
44. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
45. Rosenfeld, Meyer & Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180, 192 (Ct. App. 1983) (“The partner may
take for his own account new business even when emanating from clients of the dissolved partnership and
the partner is entitled to the reasonable value of the services in completing the partnership business, but
he may not seize for his own account the business which was in existence during the term of the
partnership.”).

Published by Reading Room, 2014

9

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 4

834

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:3

B. When One Door Closes Another Door Opens . . . But It Will Cost
You: Jewel v. Boxer
Jewel v. Boxer is the preeminent case interpreting the unfinished
business rule in a law firm context.46 In Jewel, four partners voluntarily
dissolved their partnership but with no written partnership agreement
in place, leaving the UPA to govern the dissolution.47 When two
partners brought suit for an accounting, the court recognized the UPA
imposes a duty to “wind up” all unfinished business before a
partnership may dissolve.48 For that reason, partners must share all
profits and costs incurred resulting from the firm’s unfinished
business.49 The court noted the dual purpose of the unfinished business
rule: (1) to stop partners from competing with one another over the
most profitable cases and (2) to prevent partners from fighting over
partnership property.50 Relying on UPA language, the court held that
partners are not entitled to extra compensation for completing the
unfinished business of the firm.51 Until all unfinished business of the
firm was complete, each partner must account to his fellow partners
for any profits.52 Additionally, the court ruled that all profits must be
allocated based on each partner’s interest in the partnership, rather than
46. Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Ct. App. 1984). Jewel did not involve the bankruptcy of a
law firm but rather the voluntary dissolution of a partnership; in relatively few cases have the courts
interpreted Jewel in the bankruptcy context. See, e.g., In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011
WL 4542512 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011); In re Labrum & Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1998).
47. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 15. Despite the fact that a partnership cannot waive the fiduciary duty
among partners, the Jewel court stated, “absent a contrary agreement, any income generated through the
winding up of unfinished business is allocated to the former partners according to their respective interests
in the partnership.” Id. at 16 (emphasis added). Courts have interpreted this to mean that partners can put
a “Jewel waiver” in their agreements; however, these waivers must be put in place well before bankruptcy
to avoid a fraudulent transfer claim. See In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, 408 B.R. 318, 348
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009) (ruling that although the Jewel waiver was legally valid it was technically a
transfer of assets while insolvent, and accordingly, could be challenged as a fraudulent transfer); Hage &
Mohan, supra note 29, at 15. For a discussion of In re Brobeck and the fraudulent transfer implications,
see Main, supra note 19.
48. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
49. Id. (recognizing that the burden of unfinished business cannot “fall on one former partner or one
group of former partners, unless the former partners agree otherwise”).
50. Id. at 18.
51. Id. at 17 (ruling that the UPA “unequivocally prohibits” any additional compensation for
completion of unfinished business of the firm).
52. Id.
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on a quantum meruit basis.53
Despite a compelling argument to the contrary, the court went on to
rule that the client’s right to choose counsel remained untouched
because the unfinished business rule applied only to fees allocated
after the client made the choice.54 The partners’ argument was simple:
“[F]ees . . . earned by the partner chosen by the client are not subject
to division in accordance with the partnership agreement” because that
would nullify the client’s chosen counsel if it were forced to pay
attorneys he did not choose.55
Jewel did not specifically address the rule within a bankruptcy
context or determine what types of future payments applied to the
unfinished business rule.56 Thus, the question remained: what else
could be included as property of the estate?57 The Bankruptcy Code
defines property of the estate as “all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.”58 Although
contingency fees unquestionably are included in this definition, it is
uncertain whether hourly fees should be included as well.59
53. Id. at 16–17 (reasoning that, as property of the partnership and not of the individual partners, profits
from the unfinished business of the firm could not be divided based on the amount of work done by each
partner, but rather must adhere to each partner’s respective partnership interests). The court relied heavily
on precedent in reaching its decision, summarizing Resnick v. Kaplan, where the court held that “‘in the
absence of any provision in the partnership document, . . . the aggregate of the fees collected should be
allocated according to the percentages specified in the [partnership] agreement for the distribution of
profits and losses.’” Id. at 17 (quoting Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582, 587 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)).
54. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17. Two of the Jewel partners argued that “forcing them to share future
profits infringed upon their clients’ absolute right to select the attorney of their choice.” Main, supra note
19, at 12. The court, however, was unreceptive. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17–18 (citing Rosenfeld, Meyer
& Susman v. Cohen, 194 Cal. Rptr. 180 (Ct. App. 1983) and Resnick, 434 A.3d at 588) (“[T]he right of a
client to the attorney of one’s choice and the rights and duties as between partners with respect to income
from unfinished business are distinct and do not offend one another. Once the client’s fee is paid to an
attorney, it is of no concern to the client how that fee is allocated among the attorney and his or her former
partners.”).
55. Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17 (quoting Resnick, 434 A.3d at 588) (internal quotations omitted).
56. Id. at 15.
57. See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(addressing whether hourly fees are included in the unfinished business rule).
58. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012).
59. See Arthur J. Ciampi, Claims for Unfinished Business Should be Avoided, N.Y. L.J., July 27, 2012,
available at http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/PubArticleNY.jsp?id=1202564502246&thepage=1
(noting that the unfinished business rule has frequently applied to contingent fee cases).
Although early cases seemed to signal that hourly fees would apply, there has been a recent
movement rejecting this approach. See, e.g., In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 743 (excluding hourly fees from
property of the estate); Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, 950 N.Y.S.2d 611, at *6
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In addition to whether hourly fees constitute property of the estate,
courts struggle with how to calculate “profits” for the purposes of the
unfinished business rule.60 A primary distinction between the original
and revised versions of the UPA is the level of compensation afforded
to attorneys after the profits are deemed property of the estate.61 Under
the UPA, attorneys must adhere to the no compensation rule, which
leaves them without any additional compensation for their services
while completing the unfinished business of the firm.62 Despite this
rule, and likely due to the inherent unfairness it brings, many courts
applying the original version of the UPA have allowed for out-ofpocket expenses, the partner’s profit share, and any overhead costs
associated with completing the business.63 Like the UPA’s
modifications, the RUPA entitles partners to reasonable compensation
in winding up the firm’s unfinished business, though it remains unclear
what constitutes reasonable compensation.64 In applying the modified
UPA or RUPA, judges are reluctant to take on the “thorny task” of
calculating profits, highlighting the desperate need for a more uniform
system to avoid infinite litigation issues.65

(Sup. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table decision) (recognizing a distinction between contingent fees, which
are traditionally included in the unfinished business rule, and hourly fees, which it ruled should not be
included). But see, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert
Bros. LLP), 477 B.R. 318, 344 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 2012) (hourly fees constitute property of the estate);
In re Labrum & Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391, 405 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (“[H]ourly-fee cases pending at
the time of dissolution constitute the Debtor’s ‘unfinished businesses.’”).
60. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 349–50.
61. See In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 744 (emphasizing that the RUPA has, in favor of a reasonable
compensation standard, abolished the UPA standard of no compensation that was heavily relied upon in
Jewel).
62. Main, supra note 19, at 11.
63. Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92.
64. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 404(g) (1997); see also Morrison & Trache, supra note 25, at 92. As
one court noted, precedent has allowed for attorneys to deduct “an amount attributable to the ‘efforts,
skill, and diligence’ expended” while completing the unfinished business. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin
Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), No. 11 civ. 5994(CM), 2012 WL 2952929,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2012). That same judge, however, granted an interlocutory appeal on the issue
of how best to calculate profits using such an ambiguous standard, noting the extensive investigation
necessary to complete the analysis. Id.
65. See In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 349–50 (“Resolving those issues raises new questions that go
far beyond the bounds of this opinion . . . [.]”).
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II. HOURLY FEES AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS RULE: AN
ATTEMPT AT FAIRNESS OR A NEVER ENDING DUTY?
Although it once seemed that the unfinished business rule would
apply universally, a split developed with some courts taking a new
position—hourly fees have no place in the unfinished business rule.66
Those courts favoring the majority rule, which includes hourly fees as
unfinished business, do so because, to them, there is no meaningful
way to distinguish between the two types of fees.67 These courts
believe Jewel’s failure to explicitly distinguish between hourly and
contingency fee cases suggests the court’s intention for the rule to
apply universally.68 Two recent decisions have suggested otherwise.69
In these cases, courts found ways to differentiate between the hourly
and contingency fees, emphasizing the severe implications of
inclusion, suggesting the need to limit the rule to contingency fees
alone.70 Recognizing the strong arguments on both sides, the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals recently certified the question to the New

66. Compare id. at 344 (including hourly fees in the unfinished business rule), and In re Labrum &
Doak, LLP, 227 B.R. 391, 396 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998) (same), and Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d
571, 573 (Ct. App. 1993) (same), with In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741 (ruling that hourly fees are not
included in the unfinished business rule), and Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP,
No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011) (same).
67. See In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 337 (ruling that the distinction in manner of compensation
should make no difference to the unfinished business rule) (“‘The nature of the underlying contractual
relationship between the dissolved partnership and its client does not alter the legal status of a dissolved
partnership nor does it change the fiduciary duties each partner must honor towards another. They remain
the same regardless of how an attorney agrees to be compensated by his clients.’” (quoting Robinson v.
Nussbaum, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 1997))); In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 396 (ruling that hourly
fees are property of a bankruptcy estate); Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (ruling that the unfinished
business rule includes “all matters in progress” that are incomplete upon dissolution).
68. See, e.g., Rothman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 573 (relying on Jewel’s lack of clarification as to the manner
of payment involved and deciding that the lack of explicit distinction cannot be construed to imply the
court’s intention that hourly fees should be excluded). In Jewel, there was no recognition of the specific
type of fee arrangement involved; instead, the court stated only that Boxer and two others “handled most
of the active personal injury and workers’ compensation cases.” Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (Ct.
App. 1984). The rest, as well as other kinds of cases, were handled by other attorneys in the firm. Id.
69. See generally In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 745; Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *6.
70. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 735 (emphasizing that conceptualizing property of the estate to include
hourly fees “collides with the essence of the attorney-client relationship”); Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999,
at *6 (reasoning that fees derived from contingency work could result in an amount larger than the amount
of work expended by the attorney, but when hourly fees are considered, the former partner would likely
be undercompensated for his efforts).
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York Court of Appeals for its review.71
A. “Quaint” Principles in Modern Practice: Including Hourly Fees
in the Unfinished Business Rule
1. Labrum & Doak, LLP
Fourteen years after Jewel, a bankruptcy court in the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania ruled that the unfinished business rule was intended
to cover both contingency and hourly fees while simultaneously
recognizing the result “may appear unfair.”72 Labrum & Doak voted
to dissolve in July 1997, and six months later, the firm entered an
involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy.73 The unsecured creditors
committee brought an adversary proceeding against former partners to
recover unfinished business billed on an hourly basis.74 In deciding
that hourly fees constitute property of the estate, the court relied on a
mix of bankruptcy law,75 partnership law,76 and public policy
considerations.77
The court said the definition of “property of the estate” should be
construed broadly to include “all property interests of a debtor”
71. See infra Part II.C.
72. In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 410–11.
73. Id. at 396–97. The firm ultimately converted to a Chapter 11 on January 22, 1998. Id. The firm’s
dissolution came after several of the so-called “rainmaking” partners indicated an intention to depart. Id.
at 396.
74. Id. at 395. The court previously determined that the law firm was entitled to quantum meruit
compensation from former attorneys completing contingency cases after dissolution, leaving this
adversary proceeding to focus entirely on hourly fees. Id. at 396.
75. Bankruptcy law requires two questions to be answered in this context: first, whether the fees
initially belonged to the debtor, as opposed to the attorney personally, and second, whether the fees
constitute assets of the bankruptcy estate. See id. at 409–11.
76. The court relied upon what it referred to as “two fundamental principles of general partnership
law.” Id. at 410. First, when a partnership dissolves, the existing contracts do not automatically dissolve
with it. Id. And second, when a former partner completes existing contracts, he does so as a fiduciary
working for the benefit of the partnership. Id. These principles, coupled with the lack of contrary intent
and inability to differentiate between contingent and hourly fees, led the court to conclude that all fees,
regardless of how they were billed, were to be included in the unfinished business rule. Id. at 410–12.
77. Id. at 409. (“Although the Defendants bluster about the allegedly disastrous public policy of such
principles, they are unable to cite any cases from any jurisdictions regarding law firms to the contrary.”).
Despite what the court called a “sky will be falling” argument by the defendants, it found no record of
disasters resulting in any jurisdictions that have included hourly fees in the unfinished business rule. Id.
(internal quotations omitted).
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regardless of whether that interest is “speculative.”78 Accordingly, the
court concluded hourly fees have economic value and belong to the
estate.79 This interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code coupled with
canons of partnership law focusing on fiduciary duties led the court to
include hourly fees in the unfinished business rule, as they are an
integral part of “winding up” the business of the firm.80 The court was
unreceptive to the “allegedly disastrous public policy of such
principles,” particularly that the client’s rights would be diminished,
because the rule does not contemplate overtaking cases without client
consent but rather only permits claiming a portion of the proceeds from
that work.81
2. Coudert Brothers, LLP
More recently, a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New
York reached the same conclusion.82 In re Coudert Brothers involved
a centuries-old law firm that filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in
September 2006.83 In thirteen separate adversary proceedings to
78. In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 410. According to the court, with the passage of the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978, property of the estate was expanded to include “every conceivable interest in property,
future, nonpossessory, contingent, speculative, and derivative” within the reach of 11 U.S.C. § 541. Id.
For an example of the unfinished business rule and hourly fees outside the bankruptcy scope, see
Rothman v. Dolin, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 571 (Ct. App. 1993). In Rothman, two attorneys voluntarily dissolved
their partnership and divided up the firm’s cases. Id. at 571. When one partner sued for unfinished business
profits, the California Court of Appeals did not allow for a distinction between hourly and contingency
fees, reasoning that such a decision would lead to an avoidance of contingency cases in favor of cases
billed hourly. Id. at 572–73. The court also emphasized the potential injustice that might arise when one
partner’s cases are entirely contingency based and another partner’s is entirely hourly based, as the former
would have to continually share profits and the latter would walk away with a greater share. Id. at 573.
The practical result, according to the court, would result in attorneys refusing contingency fees if they
believe dissolution is near. Id.
79. In re Labrum & Doak, 227 B.R. at 410–11.
80. Id.
81. Id. The court relied on other case law, implicitly reasoning that, because no other courts have ruled
against inclusion of hourly fees, no court should ever rule in favor of excluding hourly fees. Many of the
cases cited in support of this proposition, however, do not actually relate to hourly-specific cases. See,
e.g., Young v. Delaney, 647 A.2d 784, 792–93 (D.C. 1994) (holding that partners do owe one another
fiduciary duties in winding up the business of the firm but never distinguishing what sort of fees apply);
Hurwitz v. Padden, 581 N.W.2d 359, 361 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998) (addressing “[p]ending contingency
files” as assets of the firm but not specifically addressing hourly fees).
82. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 477
B.R. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
83. Id. at 324.
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collect unfinished business, the bankruptcy court ruled that the
doctrine applies to hourly and contingency fees alike.84 The district
court agreed, stating that “[a] departing partner is not free to walk out
of his firm’s office carrying a Jackson Pollack painting he ripped off
the wall,” which justifies applying the rule to both hourly and
contingency profits as they are often the most valuable assets.85
The “quaint” principles of partnership law, which require departing
partners to account to the partnership for profits derived from
unfinished business, do not allow for a distinction between hourly and
contingent fees, notwithstanding the unique structure of large law
firms.86 Large law firms today, the court explained, have various levels
of partners, “client hoarding, and mercenary lateral hiring” that side
step the idea of partners as co-owners in favor of a new reality
inconsistent with traditional notions of partnership.87 Even so, the
court emphasized that partnerships, by their very nature, must consist
of co-owners acting together to make a profit.88 Without including
hourly fees as part of the unfinished business of the firm, certain
matters would not be jointly owned but rather owned by a single
attorney operating in the name of the partnership.89 Though many
84. Id. at 324–25. Though the judge acknowledged the issue had never been addressed at the appellate
level in New York, he ruled that, if faced with the issue, the highest court “would conclude that the
unfinished business rule applies both to contingency fee matters and to non-contingency (billable hours)
matters.” Id. at 325.
85. Id. at 329. The court went on to add that “[p]artnership property remains partnership property,
dissolution notwithstanding, and a former partner of the dissolved firm must account for any benefit he
derives from his use of a partnership asset, even if he is not among the ‘winding up partners’ charged with
winding up the firm’s affairs.” Id.
86. Id. at 331 (ruling that partnership law would not allow for a distinction between hourly and
contingency fees, even in the face of such sophisticated business models). The argument that mega-firm
models should necessitate a contrary finding was unappealing to the court, which ruled that the law firms
can simply alter their partnership agreements if they believe they “need an alternative set of assumptions
to survive in a new marketplace.” Id. The court even went one step further, ruling that “it is far more
equitable to ask them to draft any special rules they want to follow than it is to add a gloss to the statute
applicable to the far more numerous, and undoubtedly less sophisticated, partnerships the affairs of which
are governed by the Partnership Law.” Id.
87. Id. at 330.
88. Id.; see REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997) (defining “[p]artnership” as “an association of
two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit” (emphasis added) (internal quotations
omitted)).
89. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 331–32 (ruling that the presumption must be that the business
belongs to the firm, as opposed to an individual attorney, because the business would no longer be carried
out by “co-owners” but rather a group of attorneys out for themselves, sharing nothing but their office
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firms utilize incentives as a means of encouraging partners to bring
business into the firm, these incentives rarely, if ever, include granting
that partner sole ownership of the client matter; rather, the partners
receive bonuses or some sort of quantum meruit-based compensation
instead.90 Despite the fact that many attorneys view their “book of
business” as a coveted personal asset, the court rejected such a notion
as contrary to the goals of partnership law.91
There are two ends of a spectrum when it comes to unfinished
business, as the court explained.92 On one end, there are entirely
finished matters that are completed before dissolution of the firm,93
and on the other end, is entirely new business whose relation to the
former partnership is merely historical.94 In the middle is where the
conflict lies—in those matters that are not finished upon dissolution
but are not distinct enough to constitute entirely new business.95
Executory contracts, as “unperformed” business, inherently constitute
unfinished business as they are neither new nor completed.96 The court
ruled that unless the parties indicate a contrary intent, as a matter of
law, executory contracts must be considered assets of the firm.97
space).
90. Id. at 331.
91. Id. at 330; see also Mark Harris, Why More Law Firms Will Go the Way of Dewey & LeBoeuf,
FORBES, May 8, 2012, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2012/05/08/whymore-law-firms-will-go-the-way-of-dewey-leboeuf (“The portability of the partner’s book has weakened
the bonds that hold firms together and threatens the identity of the law firm as we know it.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
92. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 332–33.
93. Id. at 332 (for example—a completed merger, a lawsuit tried to verdict, or a settlement).
94. Id. (recognizing new business as “an entirely new contract or engagement to do a piece of work”
and including in that definition retainers, even when it involves an existing client matter such as an
appeal).
95. These matters, according to the court, are “presumptively treated as a partnership asset subject to
distribution.” Id.
96. An executory contract is defined as “[a] contract that remains wholly unperformed or for which
there remains something still to be done on both sides, often as a component of a larger transaction and
sometimes memorialized by an informal letter agreement, by a memorandum, or by oral agreement.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 369 (9th ed. 2009).
97. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 333–34 (citing Stem v. Warren, 125 N.E. 811 (N.Y. 1920)). Stem
involved an architecture partnership in the early twentieth century. Stem, 125 N.E. at 811. The partnership
received a terminable-at-will contract to build Grand Central Station. Id. Before the completion of the
station, one of the partners died and the partnership dissolved. Id. at 812–13. Upon dissolution, the
partnership was paid in full for past services rendered. Id. at 813. Later, the contract was officially
terminated and a new contract was entered into with the surviving half of the partnership. Id. The deceased
partner’s estate sued for recovery of the total contract under the unfinished business rule and prevailed.
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To find intent sufficient to overcome the presumption that hourly
fees are assets of the firm, the court required either a distinction
between law and general partnerships or between hourly and
contingent fees.98 Silence in partnership agreements, in this court’s
opinion, should be construed to signify the parties’ intent to include
hourly fees as assets of the firm.99 The court paid particular attention
to the rulings of other UPA courts that did not find a distinction
between hourly and contingent fees for the purposes of the unfinished
business rule.100
To solidify its holding, the court ruled that public policy would not
dictate a contrary result.101 The defendant argued that new client
matters are a series of “mini-contracts” with each falling under a new
billing period, much like a month-to-month lease.102 The court
recognized that a firm might pursue unpaid bills from clients under this
“mini-contract” theory, but ruled that a law firm’s rights against the
client are different from the rights of former partners with respect to
Id. The fact that the contract was terminable at will and the estate was paid for all work up until the
partner’s death did not persuade the court to exclude the contract from property of the partnership. Id. The
court ruled that the executory contract was an extremely valuable asset and the benefits belonged to the
dissolved partnership. Id.
98. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 335–36.
99. Id. (“If the partners do not specify whether a particular representation is intended to be an asset of
the partnership subject to distribution on dissolution, courts treat their silence as signifying an intention
that it should . . . .”). The court acknowledged many other courts that have adhered to this principle, though
within the contingency fee context. See, e.g., Santalucia v. Sebright Transp., Inc., 232 F.3d 293, 295 (2d
Cir. 2000) (“[A]bsent an agreement to the contrary, a dissolving law firm is entitled to the value of the
contingent fee at the time of dissolution.”); Liddle, Robinson & Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 768 N.Y.S.2d
183, 188 (App. Div. 2003) (“Pending contingency fee cases of a dissolved partnership, absent a contrary
agreement, are assets subject to distribution.”).
100. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 336–37 (referencing the cases in several UPA jurisdictions
ranging from Pennsylvania to California). This logic seems slightly circular: hourly and contingency fees
cannot be distinguished because there is no way to distinguish between them, and yet it ignores a primary
argument in favor of excluding hourly fees—that they constitute finished business.
The court stated that “[e]very court in a UPA jurisdiction that has considered the precise question
posed here has concluded that billable hours matters are partnership assets in the absence of any expressed
intention that they should be treated otherwise.” Id. at 336. However, that assertion cannot be true as one
New York court ruled just that way a year earlier. See Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan,
LLP, No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at *5–6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011).
Of note, even this court said “I cannot quarrel with the proposition that contingency and billable
hour matters are different in critical respects,” which is perplexing considering its ruling to the contrary.
In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 337.
101. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 340–44.
102. Id. at 337–38.
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each other.103 The unfinished business rule, the court reasoned, is
meant to prevent one partner from exploiting assets against another,
not to enable a firm to recover clients’ missed payments, and the
remedies for collection are separate from any fiduciary
responsibilities.104
The court added that all other UPA jurisdictions hearing similar
cases have reached the same conclusion regarding public policy and
the attorney-client relationship.105 Although recognizing a conflict
between the application of the unfinished business rule and a client’s
right to choose counsel, the court elected to join other courts that have
set this argument aside as a non-issue.106 In so doing, the court relied
upon Santalucia, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals case ruling in
favor of including contingency fees in the unfinished business rule.107
The court held that the Santalucia ruling, which did not express
concern regarding an impact on the attorney-client relationship, should
apply to hourly fees as well because any deterrent to a client’s right to
choose would be present irrespective of the way firms bill the client.108
B. A Lesson in Public Policy: Excluding Hourly Fees From the
Unfinished Business Rule
Contrarily, some courts have ruled that a meaningful distinction
exists between hourly and contingency fees, and that the former should
be excluded from the reach of the unfinished business rule.109
103. Id. at 338. Unlike a month-to-month lease, which, according to the court, is a series of minicontracts, the fact that bills are sent out periodically rather than upon completion of the entire matter does
not render the matter “closed” upon payment of the bill. Id. at 339.
104. Id. at 338 (“The unfinished business doctrine does not exist to assure that a law firm is paid for the
value of work it has performed prior to dissolution. It exists to settle accounts among partners upon
dissolution of their business.”).
105. Id. at 340; see, e.g., Ellerby v. Spiezer, 485 N.E.2d 413 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Jewel v. Boxer, 203
Cal. Rptr. 13 (Ct. App. 1984). But see Welman v. Parker, 328 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010)
(noting that the unfinished business rule could “unduly impinge upon the client’s perceived freedom to
change attorneys without cause and could have a ‘chilling effect’ upon the choice of that option by the
client” (citing Plaza Shoe Store, Inc. v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53, 58 (Mo. 1982) (en banc)).
106. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 340 (recognizing the public policy argument as the strongest
offered by the defendants, but ultimately deciding to rule alongside its fellow UPA courts).
107. Id. at 344.
108. Id.
109. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 739–40 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at *6 (N.Y.
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1. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan
One case involving the voluntary dissolution of a partnership
reached the conclusion that hourly fees must be excluded.110 The court
noted that, despite an inability or unwillingness to do so by previous
courts, a key difference exists between hourly and contingency fees; a
fee collected from a contingency case could easily result in a fee
greater than the work done by a single attorney, whereas a case billed
hourly could leave the attorney with substantially less than his hourly
rate.111 In the former situation, a firm could pay the attorney his normal
rate and still retain a profit, while the latter lends itself to the possibility
of under compensation. The partner would be required to pay the estate
from his hourly rate and retain either no compensation or what a court
deems reasonable compensation, depending on the jurisdiction,
reducing the compensation he would receive had the dissolution never
occurred—an obvious disincentive to continue representation.112
The court also referred to New York’s disciplinary rules that
prohibit dividing fees for legal services with an attorney who is not
associated with a firm unless certain specific conditions are met.113
Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011).
110. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *1–3, *6. The facts between the two parties were largely disputed
as to how the firm ended. Id. at *3. Sheresky asserted that he was the “mainstay” of the firm and personally
guaranteed a new lease for the firm if it paid off his mortgage and life insurance. Id. at *1–2. The other
partners argued that the additional monthly payments were “buyout” agreements. Id. at *2. Ultimately,
the new partners formed a new firm without Sheresky and dissolved the former firm in August 2010. Id.
111. Id. at *6. The court ruled the inclusion of hourly fees in the unfinished business rule would run
contrary to a New York rule prohibiting attorneys from dividing fees for legal services when the attorneys
are not affiliated with the same firm. Id.
112. Id. To require an attorney to pay back hourly fees to the estate would seemingly contradict the rule
adopted in Kirsch v. Leventhal that allows an attorney to deduct an amount attributable to his “efforts,
skill and diligence.” Kirsch v. Leventhal, 586 N.Y.S.2d 330, 333 (App. Div. 1992). The hourly fee, at
least in theory, is equal to that very amount and repaying that fee to the estate would reduce the
compensation due to the attorney. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *6.
113. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *5.
A lawyer shall not divide a fee for legal services with another lawyer who is not associated
in the same law firm unless:
(1) the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or, by a writing
given to the client, each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation;
(2) the client agrees to employment of the other lawyer after a full disclosure that a division
of fees will be made, including the share each lawyer will receive, and the client’s
agreement is confirmed in writing; and
(3) the total fee is not excessive.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0, r. 1.5(g) (2013). The rule does not prohibit payment to
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With these considerations in mind, the court was unreceptive to a result
that would broaden the scope of the unfinished business rule to include
hourly fees.114
2. Thelen LLP
In what it called the “alarming phenomenon” of law firm
bankruptcies, a court in the Southern District of New York reached the
same conclusion, putting itself directly at odds with the Coudert
court.115 This court emphasized the inherent conflict between property
of the estate and what it called the “essence of the attorney-client
relationship” when it ruled that hourly fees should not be included in
the purview of the unfinished business rule.116 Thelen, a California law
firm, voluntarily filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy in September 2009.117 As
its attorneys scattered to other firms, the estate initiated adversary
proceedings against those partners and their new firms for the
unfinished business of the bankrupt firm.118
One such adversary proceeding was governed by New York law,
despite a partnership agreement and choice of laws provision to the
contrary.119 The court recognized that, although it was well-settled that
an attorney formerly affiliated with the firm if a separation or retirement agreement is in place. Id.
§ 1200.0, r. 1.5(h).
114. Sheresky, 2011 WL 7574999, at *7.
115. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The
court, sua sponte, granted interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether hourly fees are included in the
unfinished business rule. Id. at 736.
116. Id. at 735.
117. Id. at 736.
118. Id. at 736–37. There were two key adversary proceedings at issue in the case, both arising from
unfinished business claims. The first was against Seyfarth Shaw and the second against Robinson & Cole,
both law firms with former Thelen partners. See id. at 736–37.
119. In some choice of laws gymnastics, the court entirely circumvented a written partnership
agreement with a choice of laws provision requiring California law to govern. Id. at 737–38. The court
ruled that the fourth partnership agreement entered into by the Thelen partners constituted a fraudulent
transfer because it was entered into while the firm was insolvent. Id. The court reasoned that choice of
laws provisions only govern contractual causes of action, and because fraudulent transfers are within the
realm of tort law and the fraudulent transfer occurred in New York, New York law would apply. Id.
However, New York law only applied as to Seyfarth Shaw and California law applied to Robinson
& Cole. Id. at 743. California has adopted the RUPA and its standard of reasonable compensation in lieu
of the former UPA standard of no compensation relied upon in Jewel. Id. at 744. The court ruled, with
respect to California law, that “to the extent that Robinson & Cole earned profits from former Thelen
matters exceeding ‘reasonable compensation,’ California law dictates that those profits belong to Thelen.”
Id. at 745.
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contingency fees would be included as property of the estate, only one
New York court previously addressed the issue with respect to hourly
fees.120 Like the court in Sheresky, the Thelen court emphasized the
financial burden and disincentive that would result if the unfinished
business rule encompassed hourly fees.121 However, the court went
one step further than Sheresky, arguing that an expansion of the
doctrine would result in an “unjust windfall” to the estate while
simultaneously undercutting the public policies discussed in
Sheresky.122 Additionally, other New York courts held that when an
attorney leaves a partnership and tries a case in its entirety, his former
law firm will only be entitled for its share up until the date of
dissolution, not the entire bill.123 Because an hourly matter is
completed almost entirely due to an attorney’s “post-dissolution
efforts, skill and diligence,” the court ruled that including hourly fees
in the unfinished business rule would be directly at odds with this
precedent.124
The court also rejected the notion that executory contracts were
always property of the estate, unless explicit intent dictated a contrary
result, in favor of a more limited approach.125 The court reasoned that
an executory contract should only be included as property of the estate
where the parties “contemplate[] that it should survive
dissolution . . . .”126 With respect to hourly fees, it would be impossible
for the parties to contemplate post-dissolution survival—one cannot
contemplate that a contract will remain post-dissolution without
simultaneously infringing the client’s right to terminate his attorney at
120. Id. at 739–40. Although the Sheresky case was not binding because it was a state court decision,
its reasoning was afforded “great weight.” Id. at 740 (internal quotations omitted) (citing In re Brooklyn
Navy Yard Asbestos Litig., 971 F.2d 831, 850 (2d Cir. 1992)).
121. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 740.
122. Id. at 740 (“Unlike in the contingency fee context, applying the unfinished business doctrine to
pending hourly fee matters would result in an unjust windfall for the Thelen estate, as ‘compensating a
former partner out of that fee would reduce the compensation of the attorneys performing the work.’”
(quoting Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, LLP, No. 150178/10, 2011 WL 7574999, at
*5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 13, 2011)).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 740 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Shandell v. Katz, 629 N.Y.S.2d 437, 439 (App. Div.
1995)).
125. Id. at 741.
126. Id. (quoting Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 89 (2d Cir. 2001)) (internal quotations omitted).
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will.127
Finally, the court addressed a potential unintended and “bizarre
consequence[]” that could result from including hourly fees in property
of the estate.128 If hourly fees are property of the estate, the trustee
could sell off clients one by one.129 Allowing a firm to “liquidate” its
clients would not only be inconsistent with a client’s right to choose
and terminate counsel, it would essentially terminate this right
altogether.130 Ultimately, the court primarily focused on public policy,
as opposed to a strict interpretation of partnership law, to exclude
hourly fees from the unfinished business rule.131
C. “Doctrinal Uncertainty” Continues: The Second Circuit’s
Decision in Thelen
The trustee in Thelen timely appealed the district court’s ruling to
exclude hourly fees from property of the estate.132 On November 15,
2013, the Second Circuit, after holding that New York and not
California law applied, addressed the application of the unfinished
business rule to hourly fees.133 The court began by briefly explaining
the rule and its history relating to contingent fees, noting the
“scant . . . authority” with respect to the rule’s application to hourly
fees.134 Recognizing the split within the Southern District of New York
specifically, the court stated that given “this doctrinal uncertainty, it is
unsurprising that courts . . . have split on whether the unfinished
business doctrine applies to a law firm’s pending hourly fee
matters.”135
127. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741–42 (citing Demov, Morris, Levin & Shein v. Glantz, 428 N.E.2d
387, 389 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that a client has an “absolute right” to terminate the attorney-client
relationship at any time and for any reason)).
128. Id. at 741.
129. Id. When the court asked the trustee if the debtor firm could sell off pending matters, he was
“unable to answer definitively.” Id.
130. See id.
131. Id. at 742–43.
132. Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 736 F.3d 213, 218 (2d Cir. 2013), certified
question accepted sub nom. Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 22 N.Y.3d 1017 (2013).
133. Id. at 220–24.
134. Id. at 220–21.
135. Id. at 221, 225.
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Ultimately, the court never reached a conclusion. Instead, it listed
the arguments on both sides of the issue, certified the question to the
New York Court of Appeals, and retained jurisdiction to decide the
case following that decision.136 The court emphasized the following
advantages of including hourly fees as unfinished business: (1)
partnership rules are simply defaults that can easily be drafted to the
contrary, (2) the majority of states that have adopted the Uniform
Partnership Act include hourly fees as unfinished business, and (3) a
public policy concern exists in having different rules for hourly and
contingent cases.137 The different standards could create discrepancies
in the fiduciary duties owed to the firm based on the type of billing
involved, encouraging the view that “an individual partner’s book of
business is not an asset of the firm, but instead a piece of personal
property to be guarded with a Cerberus-like ferociousness.”138
The court additionally recognized the following benefits of
excluding hourly fees from unfinished business: (1) the special nature
of the attorney-client relationship, particularly that the client “has an
unassailable right to discharge an attorney at any time, with or without
cause,” (2) applying the doctrine to hourly fees could discourage other
law firms from accepting client matters or former attorneys from
dissolved law firms, (3) the rules of professional conduct could very
well forbid the unfinished business rule by prohibiting agreements that
restrict lawyer mobility, and (4) hourly fees are inherently different
from contingent fees, as the work on the matter is complete at the time
of payment rather than ongoing.139
The court concluded by stating that “[g]iven the significance of
these issues to members of the New York bar, we hesitate to
definitively resolve them without first seeking the views of the New
136. Id. at 220–24. The court certified the question as follows: “Under New York law, is a client matter
that is billed on an hourly basis the property of a law firm, such that, upon dissolution and in related
bankruptcy proceedings, the law firm is entitled to the profit earned on such matters as the ‘unfinished
business’ of the firm?” Id. at 225.
137. Id. at 221–22.
138. In re Thelen, 736 F.3d at 222.
139. Id. at 222–23. With regard to the third point, the court explicitly stated “we cannot rule out the
possibility that, confronted with a novel application of the rule, that court might conclude that the
unfinished business rule should not apply to any of a law firm’s cases.” Id. at 223.
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York Court of Appeals . . . .”140 On December 12, 2013, the New York
Court of Appeals accepted certification of the questions and currently
awaits briefs and arguments from the parties.141
III. A PLEA FOR CLIENT PROTECTION: REMOVING HOURLY FEES
FROM THE REACH OF THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS RULE
In modern practice, where mega-firms are common and client rights
are of the utmost importance, hourly fees must be excluded from the
unfinished business rule. Although it is certainly true that partnerships
can avoid the unfinished business rule entirely, assuming they amend
partnership agreements in time,142 why should that be a determining
factor? The majority rule, as it stands today, functions as a limitation
on practice that favors the bankrupt estate at the expense of attorneys,
clients, and the very foundation of the attorney-client relationship.143
Ultimately, hourly fees should be excluded from the unfinished
business rule for several reasons: (1) to avoid over-compensating the
estate while under-compensating its attorneys;144 (2) to protect a
client’s right to choose his attorney;145 (3) to protect an attorney’s right
to mobility;146 and (4) to avoid unintended consequences in the realm
of bankruptcy law.147
A. Overcompensation at the Client’s Expense
As the Thelen court aptly stated, the inclusion of hourly fees in the
140. Id. at 223–24.
141. Geron v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 22 N.Y.3d 1017 (2013).
142. See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP),
477 B.R. 318, 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (emphasizing that law firms may provide an “alternative set of
assumptions” in partnership agreements); Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 16 (Ct. App. 1984). However,
law firms must be careful to not put “Jewel waivers” in place if the firm is insolvent to avoid fraudulent
transfer claims. See In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 736–37; In re Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison LLP, 408 B.R.
318, 336–37 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2009).
143. See In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 735 (“The pursuit of pending hourly fee matters as assets of the estate
has become a recurring feature of such bankruptcies. But this concept of law firm ‘property’ collides with
the essence of the attorney-client relationship.”).
144. See discussion infra Part III.A.
145. See discussion infra Part III.B.
146. See discussion infra Part III.C.
147. See discussion infra Part III.D.
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unfinished business rule will almost certainly result in an “unjust
windfall” to the bankrupt estate.148 An important distinction must be
made, however, in that most courts in UPA jurisdictions, rather than
RUPA jurisdictions, have addressed the unfinished business rule and
hourly fees.149 The RUPA, which has been adopted in a majority of
states, does away with the no compensation rule set forth in the UPA
in favor of a more attorney-friendly reasonable compensation
standard.150
In states that retain the antiquated UPA no compensation rule, the
estate will often receive more money than it would receive absent the
dissolution.151 With respect to contingency fees, the estate will receive
whatever profits exceeded the partner’s compensation, and it will also
tap into what the partner would have received had the firm remained
intact because that partner cannot receive extra compensation under
this traditional rule.152 Hourly fees, on the other hand, are based
entirely on the number of hours an attorney works. A firm remaining
in business would not cut into the partner’s hourly profits, and the firm
should not do so simply because it ran into financial trouble. The
unfinished business rule, in this respect, benefits the estate at the
expense of the partner, who in all likelihood did not contribute to the
firm’s demise.153 As a basic policy matter, partnership law should not
allow an estate to get more than its fair share simply because it chose
to dissolve or filed bankruptcy.
It would seem that the RUPA’s adoption of reasonable
148. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 740.
149. See, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros.
LLP), 477 B.R. 318, 335–36 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Murov v. Ades, 786 N.Y.S.2d 79 (App. Div. 2004).
Notably, Murov only addresses contingency fee cases and does not involve calculation of hourly fees. 786
N.Y.S.2d at 79.
150. See supra notes 62, 67 and accompanying text.
151. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 740 (“Unlike in the contingency fee context, applying the unfinished
business doctrine to pending hourly fee matters would result in an unjust windfall for the Thelen estate,
as ‘compensating a former partner out of that fee would reduce the compensation of the attorneys
performing the work.’” (quoting Sheresky v. Sheresky Aronson Mayefsky & Sloan, 950 N.Y.S.2d 611, at
*5 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (unpublished table decision))).
152. See id.
153. In these bankrupt mega-firms with hundreds of partners, it is unlikely that many partners played a
crucial role in the financial affairs of the partnership. See Lattman, supra note 5 (discussing the
investigation into the former chairman of Dewey & LeBoeuf for financial misconduct).
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compensation would remedy the issue discussed above.154
Unfortunately, the reasonable compensation standard presents a
different set of issues whose uncertainty can lead to the same result as
the no compensation rule.155 Though the reasonable compensation rule
provides a more equitable outcome for attorneys on a contingency
basis, the same cannot be said for its result with hourly fees. With
hourly fees, the attorney and his client contracted for a specified rate.
To chip away from the attorney’s salary after a firm dissolves and give
him only what a court deems “reasonable” would place a trustee or
judge in between the attorney and his client, fundamentally altering the
relationship.156
B. Preserving the Client’s Right to Choose Counsel
What makes the legal partnership special is the protected
relationship of attorneys and their clients.157 As a general rule, clients
have an “absolute power to discharge an attorney, with or without
cause.”158 Where hundreds, thousands, and even millions of dollars are
spent on very technical topics that require a great deal of skill, it is

154. REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(h) (1997). The reasonable compensation standard seems to at
least take into account the degree of work put in by an attorney.
155. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), 477
B.R. 318, 349–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (recognizing the difficulty in determining compensation where an
attorney’s “efforts, skill and diligence” are included, though in the context of an amended UPA
jurisdiction rather than RUPA (internal quotations omitted)). This is particularly true in jurisdictions, like
that of Coudert, which have modified the no compensation rule to include compensation for an attorney’s
“efforts, skill, and diligence.” Id. at 349. Absent clearer instruction, courts will be forced to take on a
“thorny task” that they hardly have the resources to complete. Id. at 350.
156. See id. at 350. In the Coudert decision, the judge noted her disinclination to tackle the issues as
they would “go far beyond the bounds of th[e] opinion.” Id. at 349–50. Additionally, and assuming the
rates set are reasonable, there would be no hourly fees for the unfinished business rule to claim,
eliminating the necessity of their inclusion in the first place.
157. See Echlin v. Sup. Ct. of San Mateo Cnty., 90 P.2d 63, 65 (Cal. 1939) (recognizing the client’s
right to choose and terminate counsel as “universal”).
158. Mark H. Epstein & Brandon Wisoff, Comment, Winding Up Dissolved Law Partnerships: The
No-Compensation Rule and Client Choice, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1603–04 (1985). As another court put
it, “[c]lients are not merchandise. Lawyers are not tradesman. They have nothing to sell but personal
service. An attempt, therefore, to barter in clients, would appear to be inconsistent with the best concepts
of our professional status.” Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989) (internal
quotations omitted). As the American Bar Association wrote, “each client has the right to choose the
departing lawyer or the firm, or another lawyer to represent him” in the event of dissolution. ABA Formal
Op. 414 (1999).
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important that the client have “complete confidence” in his attorney.159
Courts across the country have recognized that the unfinished
business rule conflicts with clients’ right to choose.160 Any attempt to
consider clients as property or “merchandise” would inevitably run
afoul of the “best concepts of [] professional status.”161 The basic
premise of the unfinished business rule is that client matters unfinished
at the time of dissolution are “property of the estate.”162 This, however,
cannot be true: “Clients are not the ‘property’ of the attorney or law
firm who represents their interests; clients are free to discharge their
attorney at any time, for whatever reason.”163
Although Jewel and other courts have addressed—and dismissed—
this concern, they have done so assuming that the client already made
his choice and the unfinished business rule relates only to payment.164
Although this assumption may be sound in a contingency fee scenario
where the client stays with the same attorney until completion of the
matter, it makes less sense in the context of hourly fees.165 Hourly fees
are in essence “mini-contracts” or puzzle pieces that make up the
entirety of the relationship.166 To say that the client has made his
choice at the time of dissolution is to ignore the very real possibility
that, at any time, he can take his business elsewhere. Although the
159. Epstein & Wisoff, supra note 158, at 1604. This point is furthered by the fact that, even where a
client breaches a contingency fee contract with an attorney or law firm, the firm is entitled to no more than
the services rendered on a quantum meruit basis. E.g., Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 809
F.2d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1987).
160. See, e.g., In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 341–42; Welman v. Parker, 328 S.W.3d 451, 457 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2010); Jewel v. Boxer, 203 Cal. Rptr. 13, 17 (Ct. App. 1984); Resnick v. Kaplan, 434 A.2d 582,
588 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
161. Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411 (internal quotations omitted).
162. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 735 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(recognizing the relevant issue as whether the hourly client fees are “property” belonging to the firm).
163. Welman, 328 S.W.3d at 457.
164. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 331; Jewel, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 17–18.
165. Contingency fee cases, in this regard, have been extensively handled by courts. If a client elects to
terminate an attorney in the middle of a contingency fee arrangement, the attorney may only recover on a
quantum meruit basis. E.g., Novinger v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 809 F.2d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1987).
Contingency fee cases, by their nature, are ongoing, and clients maintain their attorneys so long as they
choose or until the end of the case. Hourly fees are more complex because, as evidenced by recent case
law, it is difficult to determine when they begin and end. See generally In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. 318;
In re Thelen, 476 B.R. 732.
166. Although this description fits well within the conceptual framework of hourly fees—that is, hourly
cases are billed periodically and can easily be broken down by billing period—some courts have been
unreceptive to such a characterization. See In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 338–39.
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client is likely unphased by accounting decisions of law firms so long
as his matters are handled appropriately, those accounting measures
have a chilling effect on the client’s choice and the attorney’s
practice.167 Including hourly fees in the unfinished business rule
assumes that the client never intended to treat each billing cycle as a
new matter, which is entirely inconsistent with the client’s right to
terminate.168
As courts recognize, these unfinished hourly contracts are
executory.169 Though one court stated that, to be excluded from the
reach of the unfinished business rule, the parties must explicitly so
intend, this argument is misplaced.170 Though it is true that a contrary
intention expressly written would be beneficial to determine the
partners’ intent, such an agreement does not eliminate the relevancy of
the client’s intent. The client is an integral part of the attorney-client
relationship and if the client, who retains the power to terminate at will,
does not contemplate that the contract should endure beyond
dissolution, there is no reason to impose such an assumption.171
C. Protecting the Attorney’s Right to Practice
Alongside the client’s right to choose counsel is the attorney’s right

167. It is difficult to imagine clients caring about where each specific dollar is going as long as the work
is completed at the proper level; but the client’s choice will be affected if the attorney does not wish to
continue representation at the risk of reduced compensation for his work.
168. With all executory contracts, if the partners indicate a contrary intent in their partnership
agreements, they will not be included as property of the estate upon dissolution of the partnership. See,
e.g., Dawson v. White & Case, 672 N.E.2d 589, 592 (N.Y. 1996). This assertion ignores the possibility
that the client originally intended for each billing period to be a separate contract.
169. Hourly fees in the context of the unfinished business rule must be classified as “executory”;
otherwise they would be considered new or completed business. See supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
170. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 333.
171. Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). The
Thelen court recognized that legal contracts are “categorically different” from other types of professional
contracts because a distinct public policy interest is well-established in the relationship between a client
and his attorney. Id. at 742–43. Relying on precedent, the court noted that previous case law held these
contracts could be property of the estate “if an executory contract with a third party contemplates that it
should survive dissolution.” Id. at 741 (quoting Scholastic, Inc. v. Harris, 259 F.3d 73, 89 (2d Cir. 2001))
(internal quotations omitted). The parties, however, could not contemplate the continued existence of
these contracts: “Thelen’s hourly fee matters cannot have contemplated post-dissolution survival without
infringing a client’s right to terminate an attorney at will.” Id.
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to practice.172 Although the Coudert court recognized that the practice
of law is unique, it did not see fit to carve out an exception for law
firms in the unfinished business rule, despite the fact that courts have
carved out exceptions before.173 According to the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making: (a) a
partnership . . . that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after
termination of the relationship, except an agreement concerning
benefits upon retirement; or (b) an agreement in which a
restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part of the settlement
of a client controversy.174

Without this rule, it would be impossible to guarantee a client’s right
to choose.175 If attorneys are not free to practice how they choose, the
client’s choice is severely limited.
Courts consistently hold that any sort of “financial disincentive for
the lawyer to continue representing his clients of his former firm”
prevents lawyer mobility and violates public policy.176 A common
“financial disincentive” is a restrictive covenant, which prevents
attorneys from practicing law during a certain time frame or in a
certain geographic area.177 The inclusion of hourly fees should be
treated in the same manner as restrictive covenants, as both constitute
financial disincentives. If an attorney makes less money on hourly
cases than he would otherwise, common sense dictates that he will stop
taking those cases, limiting both the client’s right to choose and the
172. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6 (2012).
173. In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 340. As the Coudert court noted, retainers are excluded from the
unfinished business rule as presumptively “new business.” Id. at 323 (internal quotations omitted). Certain
partnership agreements have also been rejected because they limit attorney mobility, such as restrictive
covenants. Id. at 341. As the Coudert court recognized, restrictive covenants in the practice of law violate
public policy. Id. Given that certain matters have already been excluded from the unfinished business
matter and the inclusion of hourly fees acts as a substantial financial disincentive, hourly fees should be
excluded from the rule as well.
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.6.
175. Cohen v. Lord, Day & Lord, 550 N.E.2d 410, 411 (N.Y. 1989) (noting that an attorney’s right to
practice is “to ensure that the public has the choice of counsel”).
176. See, e.g., In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 341.
177. Id.
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attorney’s ability to practice freely.178
Beyond the attorney’s choices as to what types of cases to take, the
unfinished business rule’s application to hourly fees could prove
detrimental to the attorney’s subsequent employment. It is not just
former partners that are sued for unfinished business; it is their new
partnerships as well.179 At the most fundamental level, it is more
difficult to calculate hourly fees than contingent fees. Contingency
cases relate to a particular client matter and are entirely outcomedependent; the firm will typically receive a percentage of whatever
award is granted.180 Rather than bother with potential liability, firms
could easily forego hiring partners of dissolved firms until their
liability is extinguished to avoid unfinished business claims against
them.181 A future firm will likely struggle, as courts do now, to
determine what constitutes “hourly fees” and how they should be
calculated.182 It is significantly easier to disclose all pending
contingency matters so that the new firm can make an informed hiring
decision, but the concept of hourly fees is more esoteric. Due to the
inherent difficulty in calculation and potential impact on representing
clients or seeking future employment upon dissolution, the inclusion
of hourly fees in the unfinished business rule is as much a financial
disincentive to practice as restrictive covenants and should be treated
with equal skepticism.
178. Impermissible financial disincentives have been described as anything that “‘functionally and
realistically discourage[s]’ a . . . partner from serving clients.” Denburg v. Parker Chapin Flattau &
Klimpl, 624 N.E.2d 995, 998 (N.Y. 1993) (quoting Cohen, 550 N.E.2d at 411); see also Jacob v. Norris,
McLaughlin & Marcus, 607 A.2d 142, 149 (N.J. 1992); Anderson v. Aspelmeier, Fisch, Power, Warner
& Engberg, 461 N.W.2d 598, 601–02 (Iowa 1990).
179. E.g., In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. at 322; Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP),
476 B.R. 732, 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
180. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 362 (9th ed. 2009).
181. Firms will not face the same unknown liability with contingency cases because it is easier to
disclose pending contingency matters. See supra note 24 (describing the difference between hourly and
contingency fees). Because a contingency fee is based entirely on the final award received and is only
complete when the client terminates the arrangement or the case is closed, it poses a more concrete
relationship as opposed to hourly fees, which can be broken down into mere minutes with no definite
beginning or end. A law firm will be able to make an informed decision as to whether it wishes to take
the reduced compensation for the partner’s time in contingency cases, but the same is not true of hourly
cases.
182. This fact is evidenced by the amount of litigation and time expended resolving such conflicts. E.g.,
In re Coudert Bros., 477 B.R. 318; In re Thelen, 476 B.R. 732.
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D. The Law of Unintended Consequences in Bankruptcy Court
The unfinished business rule, in the bankruptcy context, can easily
infringe on a fundamental bankruptcy right—the automatic stay.183
When any entity files for bankruptcy, perhaps the greatest advantage
is the automatic stay. The stay has been described as “‘closing the
windows and locking the doors’ to prevent any property from leaving
the newly formed estate.”184 Upon filing for bankruptcy, the automatic
stay prohibits creditors from taking any property from the estate,
pending resolution of the case.185 Assuming, arguendo, that hourly fees
are property of the estate, clients who fire their attorneys while some
of the business remains “unfinished” could feasibly be liable for
violating the stay.186
This result, however, cannot be allowed. Inextricably tied to the
client’s right to choose is the client’s right to terminate counsel.187
When the Thelen court raised this very concern, the trustee was unable
to give a definitive answer as to whether a trustee may liquidate client
matters to satisfy debts of the estate or if a client could violate the
automatic stay by firing an attorney from a bankrupt law firm.188 It is,
in this respect, that partnership law and bankruptcy principles come to
a head. Clients must be free to hire, fire, or re-hire any attorney they
please, even at the expense of creditors.189
183. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2012) (“[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this
title . . . operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of . . . any act to obtain possession of property of the
estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate . . . .”).
184. ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS:
TEXTS, CASES, AND PROBLEMS 131 (6th ed. 2009).
185. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (prohibiting “any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate” upon filing a bankruptcy
petition).
186. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741.
187. A comment in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states, “A client has a right to discharge
a lawyer at any time, with or without cause, subject to liability for payment for the lawyer’s services.
Where future dispute about the withdrawal may be anticipated, it may be advisable to prepare a written
statement reciting the circumstances.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 cmt. 4 (2012). Forty
states and the District of Columbia have adopted the comments as “guides to interpretation.” CPR Policy
Implementation Committee, State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
Comments, ABA (May 23, 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/
comments.authcheckdam.pdf. See supra Part III.B for a discussion of the client’s right to choose.
188. In re Thelen, 476 B.R. at 741.
189. Of note, the trustee already has a plethora of ways to bring money back into the estate through its
various clawback and avoidance powers. See supra notes 13–14.
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CONCLUSION
Amidst speculation of financial demise, it is all too likely the Dewey
& LeBoeuf partners experienced several immediate concerns—where
they will work, how they will pay their bills, and if they will have to
move.190 The unfinished business rule likely never crossed their minds.
That very rule, which allows claims against former partners for profits
earned while completing the unfinished business of the firm, can lead
to a deterioration of savings, client relationships, and employment
prospects.191
Although partnership law recognizes that partners, as co-owners,
owe fiduciary duties to each other, a degree of practicality is
desperately needed.192 Including hourly fees in the unfinished business
rule and expanding its breadth will undoubtedly lead to weakening of
the attorney-client relationship, reducing the client to nothing more
than a piece of property.193 And for what reason?
Favoring creditors and the estate at the expense of the attorney and
the client is hardly the preferable option, particularly when the result
can have a devastating impact on future firms, former partners, and
existing clients.194 Rather than adhere to an antiquated approach that
ignores the basic elements of legal practice and the culture of practice
today, courts should eliminate hourly fees from the unfinished
business rule to preserve the client’s right to hire or fire counsel and to
avoid litigation that inevitably treats a client as nothing more than a
Jackson Pollack painting stripped off the wall.195

190. Key Events for Dewey, supra note 6 (providing a timeline of Dewey & LeBoeuf’s 2012 failure).
191. See, e.g., Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP (In re Coudert Bros.
LLP), 477 B.R. 318, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (providing a general definition of the unfinished business rule).
192. See discussion supra Part I.A.
193. See discussion supra Part III.
194. Id.
195. See Geron v. Robinson & Cole LLP (In re Thelen LLP), 476 B.R. 732, 741–42 (S.D.N.Y. 2012);
see also discussion supra Part III.
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